houses (pubs), for example, contemporary area managers will have responsibility for a limited number of houses, allocated on a geographical or a functional basis. Area managers may specialize in those pubs that are food-led or may ensure the adherence to brand standards of houses styled on a particular theme, such as "Irish" bars. The details of these relationships are explored in a little more detail below, but part of the contention of this article is that such managers have been neglected in the historical record. As T. R. Gourvish and R. G. Wilson note in their seminal history of British brewing, the details of the creation and development of managerial hierarchies remain something of a mystery. 1 This relative absence is of broader concern as, despite the acknowledged importance of area managers in other industries, here, too, their role and its development have been little explored. Peter Mathias, for example, suggests that area managers (or their equivalents) made major contributions to the growth of multiple retailing, that is, chains of stores all operating under central direction, from the late 1890s onward. 2 Of Lipton's shops he observes that in order to benefit from expansion, "an infusion of management skill and strength also had to come at shop inspector level." 3 However, he also notes the problems of investigating the course of such actions, given the lack of appropriate surviving records. J. E. Greenwood notes that the most significant aspect of the brief period of American control of the Boots Company was the instigation of a systematic structure of "territory" managers. 4 These brief appearances in the historical record suggest the importance of the area manager but little of the nature of the job. Area managers are also important players in some of the most significant recent developments in retailing. One feature of the modern commercial environment is the widespread use of multiple systems of branded outlets run under direct management. A key enabler of this "McDonaldization" strategy has been the area manager, though even today little is known and less is understood about his or her contributions. 5 For some, they are the classic "middle" managers, adding little value but acting merely as relays between senior managers and unit managers. 6 If information technology allows senior managers direct access to information on unit performance and if unit managers can be empowered to make their own decisions, runs the argument, then there is little need for area managers. This is something of the argument presented in S. H. Haeckel and R. L. Nolan's account of "Managing by Wire," in which a prime example is the U.S. retailer Mrs. Fields Cookies. 7 In this company, business rules are inscribed in software and units are managed directly from a head office. For the purpose of this article, it is not necessary to adjudicate on these debates but rather to point out that a key element rests on the accuracy of their portrayal of the area manager in history. In this portrayal it is argued that such managers have always been simple relays in a chain of command and so were always vulnerable to replacement. By contrast, this article suggests that, based on the evidence presented, area managers were always involved in a more complex process of interpretation. A more rounded picture of the work of area managers of the early twenty-first century needs to rest on a more developed conception of their activities in prior years. Area managers in brewing are of interest because the industry experienced a shift in the years following 1950 from an emphasis on production to one on retailing. An understanding of this shift requires a brief explanation of the vertically integrated nature of British brewing. Unlike in many other countries, there has been no regulatory bar to companies both brewing beer and owning the channels for its distribution. Thanks to changes in licensing legislation in the late nineteenth century, which made the possession of houses licensed by the state to provide alcohol for consumption on the property a valuable commodity, brewing companies had acquired large estates of public houses, which they operated in most cases as distribution outlets for their production activities. Two features distinguish the sale of alcohol at the beginning of our period: most of it was through public houses owned by breweries, and most of these public houses were run by tenants "tied" to take the products of their landlords. Tenants were obliged to sell the beer (and often other products, such as spirits) supplied by their landlords, but provided that they paid their rent, they were often accorded a considerable degree of latitude in the way that they ran their pub. 8. Anthony Avis, The Brewing Industry, 1950 -1990 : Notes and Reflections, 1950 -1990 (Ilkley, U.K., 1997 .
the head brewer was firmly in charge, and the tied estate was largely regarded as a distribution network. The interwar years had seen a number of large brewers-for example, Whitbread and Barclay Perkins in the South, Ansells and Mitchells & Butlers in the Midlands, and Newcastle Breweries in the North-all build large public houses under the banner of the "improved public house movement." These pubs were, by their very size, out of the financial reach of all but the wealthiest tenants and so were often run directly by the breweries, employing salaried managers. This gave the companies some limited exposure to alternative retailing techniques, but the experiments were limited and often could be seen to be motivated as much by the need to respond to the still influential temperance movement as by the needs of customers.
9 During our period, there came to be a shift away from this focus on public houses as a mere distribution network toward one that saw them as a valuable retail asset in their own right. While some would argue that this shift accelerated after the report of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1989, in fact the shift had started much earlier. 10 The commission's report advocated the disposal of the greater part of the large estates operated by the major brewers in the name of the enhancement of consumer choice. This provision, as eventually implemented, did indeed accelerate the split between production and retail, with some brewers choosing to exit from brewing entirely and with new companies emerging who focused entirely on running public houses. However, these developments marked an acceleration in the pace of developments that had already been germinating within the industry. As part of the changing emphasis on retailing, the industry's major companies increasingly turned to direct management of their public houses, a development that in turn emphasized the importance of area managers. This article explores the developing role of the area manager in the context of the shift from a focus on production to one on retailing in the brewing industry in general and in Allied Breweries in particular. This company illustrates particularly well the difficulties that many companies faced in resolving the tensions between a desire to achieve market share for the products of their brewery on one hand and the meeting of customer needs through retailing activities on the 9. Alistair Mutch, "Shaping the Public House, 1850 -1950 : Business Strategies, State Regulation, and Social History," Cultural and Social History 1, no. 2 (2004 10. Gerald Crompton, "'Well-Intentioned Meddling': The Beer Orders and the British Brewing Industry," in The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry, ed. R. G. Wilson and T. R. Gourvish (London, 1998), 160-75. other. As long-standing employers of managers in their public houses, Allied Breweries had a considerable tradition of house supervision as "policing," a tradition that proved difficult to change. This was coupled with a desire to be market leaders in branded beers, which meant that issues of productive capacity were always high on the agenda for discussion. In addition, the records that survive and are accessible are helpful in illuminating the tensions and processes that were at work. When we set this against the experience of other companies in the industry, notably Whitbread, the extent to which past traditions hampered current developments becomes clear.
The years following 1950, it will be argued, saw a shift in the way in which area managers were used. This shift was from 'control,' as expressed in the title 'supervisor,' to 'interpretation,' as expressed in the term 'manager.' These terms 'control' and 'interpretation' are analytical not descriptive. Much writing on the nature of management has been concerned with descriptions of what managers do.
11 In the course of such accounts doubt has been cast on the notion that management fulfills particular functions. However, as Alan Thomas points out, we are unlikely to "see" functions being performed because they are often completed collectively. 12 Tony Watson notes that managers exist not by virtue of their activities but because of their function for the organization. He suggests that we need to view management in three interrelated ways: as an activity, as a group of people, and as a function. 13 Control and interpretation enable us to consider the notion of function in a little more detail. By 'control' is meant a role with a primary function of ensuring that business targets are met. These could be sales targets, but historically in the brewing industry they have also included disciplinary tasks, such as ensuring that nothing was done to endanger the license granted by the local magistrates that allowed for the consumption of alcohol on the premises. As brewers shifted to a retailing orientation, they became more interested in how house staff interacted with customers, with the presentation of products, and with the physical appearance of the house, among other matters. Area managers thus became concerned with a wider range of activities. They began to adopt a different attitude toward staff in the house, the balance starting to shift away from discipline and toward development. However, the 11. A classic example is Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (Hemel Hempstead, U.K., 1980) . 12. Alan B. Thomas, Controversies in Management: Issues, Debates, Answers (London, 2003) .
13. Tony Watson, In Search of Management: Culture, Chaos, and Control in Managerial Work (London, 1994) . existing organizational context was crucial in conditioning the nature and depth of this shift. Some companies, notably Whitbread, were far more successful than others, notably Allied Breweries, in making the necessary changes. The article begins its exploration of these trends by presenting an overview of two shifts in the industry: a move toward a retailing rather than a production orientation and a concomitant shift toward the wider use of managers as opposed to tenants in the running of public houses. In this context I then explore a number of precursors, as these shaped the use of area managers. I explore antecedents in the "abroad cooper," the house inspector, and the agent. This then forms the context to explore a number of facets of the shift from house supervisors to area managers-changes in the structuring of operations, a move away from stocktaking and discipline toward development, and aspects of recruitment and selection. I then return to the question of information use, with the suggestion that computer-enabled information systems demanded a shift in the role of the area manger from control to interpretation, as they gradually made more information available to house managers. However, the strength of existing traditions played an important role in conditioning whether organizations such as Allied Breweries were capable of making such a shift.
Retailing and Public House Management
At the beginning of our period, the brewing industry was characterized by a large number of vertically integrated companies whose public house estates were seen as adjuncts to the central task of brewing beer. They had emerged from the experience of the Second World War, in which beer and pubs were seen as vital to the maintenance of morale, something that had largely discredited the temperance message, which by 1950 was no longer a significant factor. 14 The previous strength of the movement had, however, conditioned the responses of many in the industry. They operated in a defensive mode, which took little account of changing customer requirements. However, more and more breweries became aware, in part thanks to the insistent prompting of the trade press, that there were shifts in leisure opportunities, such as the coming of television, that threatened the previous dominance of their public houses. it came changes in the way in which pubs were run. Traditionally, most pubs were run either as "free houses" (that is, by independent businesspeople who owned their own house and were able to go to any supplier) or as tenanted houses. In some areas, notably Liverpool and Birmingham, houses had been under direct management since the nineteenth century, and this practice had spread further during the interwar years.
20 Direct management meant a commitment to heavy overhead costs, but it gave tighter control of activities in the pub, as well as both the wholesale and the retail profit. The practice grew in the 1950s because of the desire of many pub-owning brewers to offer a wider range of products, notably food. Not only did this require capital investment to provide the necessary facilities, but it also needed selling and other skills on the part of those running the pubs. the manager, and this was an increasing trend during the period. Two surveys completed by the Brewers' Society enable us to measure something of the scale of the shift toward management over the period. 23 The first was a return for internal purposes; the second was prepared as a confidential briefing document for discussion with the government. Table 1 presents the summary figures. The 1960s saw a great wave of mergers out of which emerged six major national brewers that owned large pub estates. These six companies-Allied Breweries, Bass, Courage, Scottish & Newcastle, Watneys, and Whitbread-swallowed up large numbers of regional breweries, clearly visible in the steep decline in the number of individual companies. (A seventh company, Guinness, also supplied beer on a national scale but owned only two outlets at production sites. Its experience is not covered further here, as selling to other breweries and wholesalers posed a different set of problems to those explored here of controlling and developing activities in the public house.) The 1960 survey return is interesting in that it was completed before the great wave of mergers that swallowed up so many regional breweries. It therefore enables us to see where management was at its strongest. Twenty-four breweries had over 60 percent of their estate under management. Of the ten with over 90 percent in management, six were in Scotland, two in Liverpool, one in Newcastle, and one in Manchester. These were, then, the traditional strongholds of management, but we need to add Birmingham. Ansells and Mitchells & Butlers may have had lower proportions under management (given larger overall estates), but, with managed estates of 910 and 776 houses respectively, these were the giants of the "managerial system," joined in scale by Newcastle Breweries with 423 managed houses and Scottish Breweries with 556. House management was, then, as much a function of regional tradition as it was of size, as we 23 . Only a few small companies remained outside the ambit of the Brewers' Society during the period, so these figures represent the vast majority of brewerowned houses. In 1961 the total number of public houses was 77,767; in 1971 it was 73,116. The difference is therefore largely the number of "free" houses. can find some very large companies with very little of their estate under management. Table 2 gives the proportions for companies with over 750 pubs in their estates and indicates wide differences in practice, with companies such as Charrington, Steward & Patterson, and Bristol Brewery Georges having very low numbers under management. While some of this can be accounted for by the nature of the estate-most of Steward & Patterson's houses, for example, were in rural East Anglia-brewers with large urban concentrations also fought shy of direct management. Of particular interest are the predominantly London brewers like Charrington, with Watney and Truman also having relatively few managed houses. The noteworthy exception here is Whitbread. This is not shown in table 2 because it only had an estate of 569 houses, but 16.7 percent of these were managed. Given their extensive involvement with the "improved public house movement," the proportion was still low, but it is indicative of what was to come. in 1969. 24 The relative speed of this change from a low base brought protests from tenants' leaders in the early 1970s, especially when Watneys engaged in a fairly heavy-handed process of conversion from tenancy to management.
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Of course, we lose the regional detail in the 1971 figures, by which time the mergers of the 1960s had produced six companies of national scale and reach. However, the 1971 list, unlike its 1960 predecessor, was categorized by type of company, and if we summarize it using the Brewers' Society headings, we get the figures in table 3.
From these figures we can see how the large companies (which in this case also include Guinness) were making a much greater commitment to the managerial system, and in the account that follows we will see how the learning spread within the newly merged companies. One form of learning was about the ways in which this growing number of managed houses could be supervised. We can follow some of this process by exploring the experience of Allied Breweries in a little more detail.
Allied Breweries and the Dominance of Production
Allied Breweries was one of the "big six" that emerged out of the merger movements of the 1960s. It was formed by the defensive merger of three major regional breweries-the Birmingham brewers Ansells, Tetley Walker of Yorkshire and Lancashire, and Ind Coope. The last was the driving force behind the company and was one of the few companies in the industry after 1950 with aspirations toward national coverage. With breweries in Burton and Romford, its major 24. Ind Coope, Census of Properties, 1954 Properties, -1967 areas of influence were in the south and east of England, but it had during the course of the 1950s acquired a number of regional breweries. It was also interesting in an industry dominated by family-owned and -influenced companies in having a board responsible to more anonymous shareholders. Despite the presence on the boards of a number of titled figures, it was in practice run by executive directors and shaped by the powerful figure of Edward Thompson. He had succeeded his father Neale as managing director and became chairman in 1955. 26 Under his leadership, Ind Coope increased the role of executive directors on the board, as well as extended the ranks of non-executive directors to those with commercial, as opposed to aristocratic, connections. As part of these shifts, the company made structural adjustments, creating, for example, a Managed House Committee under the control of the director Bernard Carfoot, and promulgating a series of policies to increase the importance of retailing.
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A tension at the heart of the company, however, proved to be a major barrier to a shift toward retailing and hence to the development of the role of the area manager. We have already seen that there was awareness at the board level that the nature of the pub was changing. In response to the Whitbread statement in 1956, "it was agreed that the Company's policy should be to increase our Managed House estate."
28 This even prompted in 1957 the then radical suggestion that the board consider splitting the company into divisions for production, sales, and estate. Such a move might have meant that it could "obtain a clearer impression of the earning capacity of the various sides of the business" and make "for easier management both in connection with direction and in the training of personnel." 29 But it would have been a radical departure from the long-standing tradition of vertical integration, in which the leading role was very definitely that of the brewer, a departure that was not to happen in the industry until first Grand Metropolitan (by 1972 owners of Watneys) and then Whitbread separated out their managed houses to be run as independent national operations. The realization of this strategy led to reciprocal arrangements with other brewers. In some cases this meant that in return for stocking Double Diamond from Ind Coope in their outlets, brewers would offer their beers for sale in Ind Coope pubs. In some cases, however, Ind Coope felt that there was little market for such beers and had to offer public houses a substitute. Another means of expanding the sale of beers like Double Diamond was the acquisition of other companies. In 1957, for example, Benskins of Watford was acquired, and the immediate action was to remove Bass, Carling, and Worthington from sale. However, such moves brought with them large estates of houses that were often not in line with the general policy of shifting toward greater management of the estate. Of some 600 Benskins public houses, only seven were under management. 31 In other words, the objective of expanding sales in terms of branded beers was given priority over the broader development of the estate. It could be argued that these tensions were resolved by the merger movements of the 1960s in favor of production. At the end of the 1950s Ind Coope had considerable success with its lager, Skol, notably in the Scottish market. However, this success was threatened by the activities of the Canadian entrepreneur Eddie Taylor. Taylor was promoting his rival Carling lager through the mechanism of encouraging mergers within the industry. 32 In 1960 the Ind Coope Committee of Management, noting "the E. P. Taylor threat and his saturation promotion techniques," was warned that "this summer may well provide the last chance of dominating the Home-brewed lager market. commitment was part of the heritage of many other companies in the industry, but in Allied Breweries it was reinforced by a policing orientation on the part of its area managers. In order to understand this orientation and its impact, we need to explore the antecedents of the area manager in the industry in general and in Allied Breweries in particular.
The Antecedents of Area Management
We can categorize these antecedents under three broad headings: the "abroad cooper," the house inspector, and the agent. One problem for breweries was that the quality of their product, which was still "live" in the casks supplied to landlords, was dependent on the cellar management skills of their tenants. Poor cellar management would degrade the beer; however, any adverse reputation would likely not be attached to the pub but to the brewer. So brewers needed a means of ensuring quality. In the London breweries in particular, where most of the estate was at least nominally free (trade being secured by means of loans rather than by ownership), the "abroad cooper" was sent out from the brewery to check on how beer was being kept (the cooper being the tradesman who constructed the wooden barrels in which beer was supplied). By 1899 the role within at least one brewery, Watneys, had expanded, with a director recalling that "these Abroad Coopers (or 'Broad Coopers' as they were commonly called) combined the duties of District Managers with collecting and attending duties." 41 While the Brewers Journal in 1937
announced that "gone, is the 'abroad cooper'-or almost so," the title still survived. 42 In 1959, for example, Mathias noted that "in Truman
Hanbury Buxton the district managers are still called the 'abroad clerks' after their eighteenth-century forebears who supervised the monthly collections from publicans; at Whitbread there are still 'abroad coopers. '" 43 Apart from indicating the very important force of tradition in this industry, what these survivals also point to is the roots of area management in some companies in the assurance of product quality and in account collection rather than in retailing. This was recognized at an early stage by Sydney Nevile of Whitbread, whose early attempts to develop training for those running public houses went under the heading of "Cellar Management." He acknowledged that "the scope of that technical education would have to go very far beyond the handling of fermented beverages, and it should eventually include the handling of refreshments, elementary law, some knowledge of accounts, and the many other matters which touched the licensed trade." 44 However, training courses for the retail trade were still dominated by technical issues into the 1950s, with one commentator observing that "quite honestly, the majority of us who are retailers never think for long about the art of selling. We are far too content to leave that side out of our calculations." 45 The technical-inspection aspect of the antecedents of the area manager thus had a considerable impact.
There was also another model, one that had an emphasis on discipline. This was the model developed by those breweries that directly managed their public houses, especially those in Liverpool and Birmingham. Here the model drawn upon was that of the police, with titles like "house inspector" and "managed house superintendent."
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Other terms were used. In Liverpool, Robert Cain's area managers were the "walking managers," but the function remained broadly the same-to ensure discipline and adherence to company procedures.
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In some companies the inspector also collected cash and took stocks. In most companies stocks were taken separately, but house inspectors were often drawn from the ranks of stocktakers. The use of information about stocks was a central part of the disciplinary weaponry available to the area manager. This focus on discipline and the use of information was an enduring legacy of the managed house system, but there were signs even here that some change was necessary. In 1923, for example, Alexander Part, general manager of Barclay Perkins's newly established managed house division, argued that "it should be part of their duty to keep statistics." 48 In one of the rare discussions of managerial activities in the trade press, the Brewers Journal in the following year argued that breweries should consider their house inspectors as more akin to "experts" or business advisers. This was an attempt by the journal to generalize from experience with managed houses to the brewery estate more generally, arguing that tenants could also benefit from such a system. However, what was of more importance in the tenancy system here was the persistence of the agency as a form of business organization. Again, we see the survival of linguistic forms beyond changes in content. In Allsopps, later a constituent part of Ind Coope, the shift from independent agents who stocked the company's products alongside those of others to salaried managers began in the 1860s, but the term persisted well into the 1950s. 50 In Ind Coope, the estate was organized in a patchwork of companies and "agencies." This was more of a holding company structure than an integrated company. To take one example of many, in 1948 a decision was "approved by the Committee, initialled by the Chairman and recommended to the Board of Showells Brewery Company Limited for approval." 51 This patchwork of responsibilities meant that agency reporting was patchy, and there was no clear oversight of the estate. In particular, agencies and constituent companies were generally centered on a brewery, which supplied a mixed estate of tenanted and managed houses. This devolved structure of vertically integrated local companies meant that it was difficult to carry out national retail policies in any consistent manner. The process of change began with the reorganization of the estate into a number of regions, with a director responsible for each. In 1953 it was decided by the board of Ind Coope "to vest wide powers analogous to those of a Managing Director in Group Captain B. G. Carfoot in connection with the Managed House and Hotels side of the business but subject to the approval of the Committee of Management in matters of policy." 52 This saw the beginnings of a more systematic approach to house supervision, but the managed and tenanted houses were still part of a mixed estate controlled by an agency, often with a brewery at its heart. In 1923 Alexander Part had advocated the creation of a separate managed house department, and this was the practice of several of the Birmingham and Liverpool companies, but the legacy of the agency was still a powerful one. Indeed, the mergers of the 1960s saw the disappearance of many such dedicated departments, as the industry struggled to find appropriate forms of organization, and the final separation of the retail estate from the production activities of most breweries was not to occur until the 
Area Managers, Control, and Information
One key aspect of the merger movement was the opportunity that it gave for learning within the new companies. This was important in an industry that had traditionally been relatively closed to influences from outside. 53 The trade press tended to focus on issues of trade defense, understandable in an industry under constant public scrutiny, but not an approach likely to encourage the development and sharing of new managerial practice. However, the corollary of this learning was that it was heavily conditioned by existing traditions, which were heavily influenced by the policing orientation of area management. One noticeable aspect of this was the scale of operations that these managers were expected to oversee. As a means of comparison, it can be noted that in one company in the 1990s area managers generally had between sixteen and eighteen houses to look after. 54 In Liverpool in 1959, by contrast, two assistant managers were appointed by Walker Cain in the managed house department, "each to supervise two hundred houses." 55 It is not clear whether this was through house supervisors, but in the successor company, Tetley Walker, area managers were to be responsible for 300 houses, each with the support of supervisors who were expected to run 70 managed houses or 120 tenancies. 56 In 1962 Joshua Tetley created a Managed House Department for the first time. Its proposed responsibilities are outlined in table 4. It is interesting to note that this constellation was decided on following visits to the new component parts of the merged company. One of the key visits was to Ansells in Birmingham, where supervisors controlled both managed and tenanted houses, each supervising on average sixty-eight managed houses and nineteen tenancies. What can be seen from these examples is the large numbers of houses, which suggest that supervision rested on a policing base rather than on a detailed engagement with activities at house level. An indication of this style can be obtained from this account, given by a former Birmingham supervisor from the 1960s:
One of the first things you did and this is in the mid-sixties, you took the manager into the cellar and I've literally, I have actually copped hold of a manager by his lapels and decked him. There was a much more aggressive [style] but you would also say to the manager you can take six pence in the pound out of the till. If you take seven pence out of the till I shall have you in this cellar and I shall thump the living day lights out of you. If you take five old pence out you are equally as big an idiot as I take you for because I'm telling you I shall look the other way.
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This direct approach was supported by control over information, particularly that relating to stocks. The same former house supervisor, when asked about information, especially that about the stock position, responded, "Right, knowledge is power so the district manager wouldn't take that back down to the house." 59 This control over stock information was at the heart of conflicts between the newly emerging group of house managers and their employers. In Tom Berkeley's fictionalized account of a new manager entering a house in the 1950s, it is explained that all the invoices are held at the head office:
"Then how d'you know what profit the house is making?" I asked.
"You don't," he smiled. "They take good care o'that; but you soon find out if it aint enough." This was policed by the house inspector, and information about stocks was used to stimulate performance. As Berkeley's manager complained, "Admittedly, we were not getting the percentage per barrel mentioned by Mr. Handen, but we had considerably increased the aggregate profits of the house: yet, every other month the directors saw fit to flog their willing horses-meaning Irene and myselfby saying the stocks were short." 61 Such insights are fictionalized, but they ring true with the complaints registered on a frequent basis by licensees' representatives with the Brewers' Society. For example, Leonard Percey, general secretary of the Licensed Victuallers Defence League, wrote in 1954 to note that he was disturbed "by the number of instances in which allegations of bad stocks are made against Managers by Brewers without the latter being prepared to produce the figures on which such allegations are based." 62 These complaints continued through the period, with area managers being identified as part of the problem in 1968. The Brewers' Society found it necessary to "strongly recommend all members of the Society to review their arrangements for stock-taking and to ensure that their outside or district managers acted reasonably when shortages became apparent, having regard particularly to the managers' difficulties over staff."
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Of particular interest here is a note on an agreement with a house manager drawn up by Boddington's Brewery in the early 1970s. It stipulates that any problems "be raised either orally or in writing with your immediate superior (Stocktaker). If he is unable to settle the matter, he will refer it to the Managed House Supervisor, who, if he in turn cannot settle it, will refer it to the Director responsible for Managed Houses."
64 What this suggests is the continuing centrality of stocktaking. It is also interesting to note that the manager of the department is termed the "supervisor." A typical route into area management was through stocktaking or audit. The former area manager for Bass in the 1960s, for example, had worked in the licensing department before taking charge of an area of twenty-four pubs in the 1960s. When asked whether house managers ever became area managers, he observed "very occasionally. That was not particularly acceptable because the areas were so small [that] you were known and it was felt that you couldn't transfer from being a soldier to an officer." 65 What is interesting here is partly a reminder that the system worked in urban areas because of a geographical concentration of pubs but also the metaphor drawn from army practice. The association of the area manager role with control and discipline, supported by the use of information, was a powerful and continuing one. Those companies that had long employed house managers had evolved complex systems for the monitoring of house performance. 66 These systems were centrally concerned with ensuring that sales were accurately accounted for in an industry where stocks had a high value and could easily be converted into cash and in which transactions involved large sums of cash in small denominations. Thus, Ansells in 1961 employed twenty-three stocktakers as against sixteen house supervisors, supported by sixteen stock clerks. 67 Stocks were taken once a month in each house, and the results were expected to be supplied to area managers within two to three days. They could be then used to monitor house performance but not to explain to house managers how to improve performance. In 1956 Ind Coope had taken on more stocktakers "to deal with the steadily increasing Managed House estate." 68 In Mitchells & Butlers these results were processed by 1958 using accounting machines to produce trading accounts for each house. 69 However, the replacement of these machines by computers saw the focus on purchasing and sales systems, especially for the growing "off-sales" to supermarkets and offlicenses. The first computer ordered by a U.K. brewery, Scottish & Newcastle in 1962, was used to track stock movements between production and distribution. 70 By 1965 Courage had used one to produce sales statistics and was planning to move on to managed house accounts. 71 However, this process was by no means easy; in At the beginning of the year under review we brought into service a third generation computer, and introduced a computer-based system of invoicing and billing our customers. With hindsight it is clear that we underestimated the magnitude of the problems which such a step involved and were further handicapped by a series of failures in the equipment itself.
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This meant that progress in supplying more detailed information at the level of the house was far from easy. What was still harder was shifting the use of this information by area managers from a policing to a development orientation. In 1965, for example, the Birmingham brewers were concerned about the increasing proportion of their public house managers who were joining trade unions. They were particularly concerned about the potential incursions of the Transport and General Workers Union, raising the specter of concerted action in both the brewery and distribution network. Their response was to encourage the better organization of local Licensed Victuallers Associations, with the formation or strengthening of sections for managers with whom the brewers could negotiate. However, at the root of tensions between managers and brewers were "overenthusiastic but misguided supervisory staffs."
73 This was to be tackled by training such supervisors "to lead and encourage rather than push or threaten the manager." This approach was to be backed up by the formulation of a code of conduct "to be observed by all supervisory staff in their dealings with managers." Of central importance was the concern "to examine the methods of stocktaking at present used and to find a method which keeps the manager informed and satisfies him about the position whenever stock is taken."
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These initiatives found some favor in wider circles. In 1974, for example, a Brewers' Society briefing document argued that all house managers should be provided with full profit and loss accounts and noted that "this is common practice in Bass Marketing Companies already."
75 Such recommendations were part of the agenda of the "modernizers" within the Brewers' Society, who saw them as part of their campaign to raise the status of house mangers. In 1969 a briefing note pointed out that a key aim of the Brewers' Society was "to build up the status of the public house manager who is becoming an increasingly important figure in the industry and whom it is more than ever important to identify as part of the brewery management team." 76 In such attempts it was realized that this goal also required attention to the role of the area manager. What was required was a shift away from a policing toward a more developmental role. Such changes had been happening within some companies for some time. In Ind Coope, for example, the need to raise the standard of supervision was recognized in 1955, and in 1956 a training syllabus was drawn up. 77 In 1961, "so as to relieve Managers of Managed House Departments of day-to-day routine office work and thus enable them to carry out their supervisory duties more efficiently," the managerial workforce was split into trade managers, who would be solely concerned with "day-to-day supervision and control," and others, who would have administrative and stocktaking roles. 78 Of course, the emphasis here was still on control, but in the same year the company created a central Managed House Services Advisory group, which was to oversee policy decisions and results in the managed houses. 79 In the following year the proposal to set up a Managed House Department at Tetleys noted that "it is necessary to spend time with each manager, at his house," in order "to guide and assist managers to increase Sales at the same time closely watching the profitability of houses." 80 We can see in these changes some harbingers of the shift toward a more developmental role for area managers. However, we also have to be aware of the limits to these changes. In 1984 Allied Breweries conducted a far-ranging review of their strategy:
The industry has bought large quantities of consumer research for years, indeed decades, and has been thoroughly familiar with the views of its pub customers. . .. Yet the significance of the information has never been properly appreciated, still less acted upon. It is an indictment of AB [Allied Breweries] and the whole industry that so little has been done to raise retailing standards and to set out in a properly professional manner to give pub customers want they want. The whole thrust of the review was to argue that Allied Breweries had to execute a decisive turn to placing retailing at the heart of its strategy and that central to this was the further development of both managed house operations and the role of the area manager. It recognized the central importance of the area managers but suggested that they were "frequently of a low standard or are poorly motivated as a result of routine drudgery in their jobs." The solution was "to reduce the absurdly wide span of their current duties, minimise bureaucracy and eliminate the sterile policing mentality which together have done so much to destroy their motivation and keep retailing standards low." 82 This is a savage indictment of the lack of progress within the company since the deliberations of the Birmingham brewers twenty years before. However, these failings have to be seen in the context of the weight of both the previous traditions of area management, established in some parts of the company since the mid-nineteenth century, and of the continuing focus on production, which led to neglect of both the estate and managerial practice. While Allied Breweries made some tentative steps toward retailing, these were limited compared with the changes implemented by others across the sector. In the 1990s Allied Breweries was one of the early adopters of themed and branded pubs, being a pioneer in, for example, the development of "Irish" bars. However, its initiatives lacked conviction and, it could be argued, failed to reach their true potential because of a lack of investment in the underlying infrastructure. This failure to really embrace the organizational consequences of retailing was a contributory factor to its eventual decision to leave the sphere of licensed retailing altogether in the late 1990s in favor of a focus on the production and marketing of global branded drinks.
Conclusion
The evidence on which this account is based is necessarily limited. The nature of record retention in companies means that it is rare to get material that directly concerns the status and activities of area managers. There is much more, for example, on house managers because they had representative bodies pressing their case with trade associations such as the Brewers' Society. 83 This means that we often 82. Ibid., 53. 83. Ted Elkins, Mild and Bitter, Sir: The Story of the National Association of Licensed House Managers (London, 1976). have to draw inferences from the limited material that we have. In drawing these inferences we have to recognize that a major concern among brewing companies was in structuring their operations to cope with the major mergers that reshaped the industry over the period. This saw the emergence of six major integrated companies whose task was to design suitable structures to match their newly acquired national reach. 84 Of all these companies it was only a new entrant to the industry, Grand Metropolitan, that organized at least its managed houses into a separate division. Although Whitbread during this period moved to regional structures, the other companies tended to persist with vertically integrated versions of their constituent companies and with a focus on production efficiency. In turn, it was Whitbread who established a national managed house division in 1984 with the benefit of an influx of disaffected staff from Grand Metropolitan's Chef & Brewer division. It is noticeable that Whitbread was relatively successful in its retailing operations, which were based on its historically small estate and commitment to the free trade. This meant that it had not built up the same traditions of policing in the running of its estate, which, allied to its historically metropolitan and open attitude to innovation, meant that it seemed to adopt the new emphasis on development more successfully. However, this period generally saw the increasing importance of the managed house and with it changes in the nature of the area manager's job. The account presented has contributed some of the detail on managerial hierarchies in this industry that Gourvish and Wilson called for. 85 What this detail indicates is the wide variety in practice across the sector. Developments in management practice were not some sort of blind reaction to environmental forces but were conditioned by the weight of taken-for-granted practice and ideas built up over long periods of time. Market positioning played some role in this, as companies like Allied Breweries and Bass, which had grown up supplying the heavy industrial markets, were much slower to respond to the need for change than others with less established markets. However, the weight of internal practice was also important. In all the vertically integrated companies there was a powerful legacy of the predominance of brewing, but this was reinforced in companies like Allied Breweries by traditions of policing in the operation of a network of outlets that were seen more as a distribution channel than as a retailing operation. This historical conditioning continues to play a role in the nature of the area manager's function in contemporary licensed retailing. 84. "Brewing in Ferment," Economist (19 Sept. 1964), 1144-46. 85. Gourvish and Wilson, British Brewing Industry. While this function is now much more one of development than policing, its role as a whole remains relatively neglected. 86 However, rather than fading away as some of the more extreme predictions about the nature of "middle" managers would suggest, the role has gained in importance. One of the key issues for such managers lies in the interpretation of the information supplied by the computer-based systems they use. The argument deployed by those who predict the demise of the middle manager is that historically such managers were simply information relays, whose function can be replaced by electronic means. However, this review of area managers and information indicates that it was the advent of computers that actually resulted in area managers becoming part of an information chain. Before that date they were the endpoint for the distribution of information. In part, computers were used to bring information down to the house level and to assist in the reshaping of the area manager's job. In this reshaping area managers moved from being primarily concerned with discipline, in which they used information as a weapon to control house managers, to being more concerned with interpretation, in which they had to share information with the house manager and use it to assess business performance. However, the degree to which they made this journey varied substantially from company to company. The evidence presented here suggests that in Allied Breweries they had barely begun to embark on the journey by the mid-1980s, something that may have contributed to the company's eventual exit from licensed retailing in the late 1990s.
